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THE YOUTH-OBSCENITY PROBLEM-A PROPOSAL
TEm SFrrnG
The problem of obscenity regulation and the law is rapidly becom-
ing the most prominent constitutional issue of the decade. Indeed,
like most problems of this nature, it has drawn the attention not only
of courts, legal scholars and students but of clerics, crime enforcement
officials, writers and certainly not least, elements of an outraged
citizenry.
One element of the broader problem is the attempt of various states
and communities to evolve a method to control obscene publications
which will satisfy the constitutional requirements as laid down by the
Supreme Court. There have been numerous methods of enforcement
and controls proposed, but only a few sanctioned.
In the 1963 term the Court made a further curtailment upon state
regulation by a decision in a Rhode Island case wherein it struck
down certain practices of a state commission created to encourage
morality in youth. This commission avowedly was dedicated and
authorized solely to act in the protection of children from obscenity.
As the case came up in this context it points to the serious problem
of obscenity and the juvenile and what if anything can be or should be
accomplished in this area.
This problem will be the main consideration of this note.
TEE CR SADERS v. LmERTAaws
Parents and crime enforcement officers argue that great quantities
of obscene and pornographic matter are reaching our young people,'
which is having the effect of "contributing to juvenile delinquency,
inciting to sex crime, leading to perversion and posing a serious threat
to our morality."2 This group points to the rising number of sex
crimes 3 and crimes in general as indicative of the great danger to our
'Report of the New York joint Legislative Committee to study the Publica-
tion and Dissemination of Offensive and Obscene Material 11 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as 1962 Report]; see also Hearings on H.R. 11454 Before a Subcommittee on
Special Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess (1960).
2 1962 Report 11.
3 In 1957 there were nearly eight forcible rapes per one hundred thousand
inhabitants in the United States. In 1958 this figure increased 10.5 per
cent, a forcible rape occurring every 36 minutes. In the year 1959 young
people under the age of 18 accounted for 18.8 per cent of all arrests for
forcible rape. By 1960, there had been an additional 8 per cent in-
crease in this crime as compared with the same period for the prior year.
During the same period, the records show a large increase in the crimes
of aggravated assault and murder.
In 1961, during the nine months January to September, in cities of
(Continued on next page)
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society toward which legislation and control must be directed.4 As a
result of the pressure being brought to bear by these "crusaders"5 a
mass of legislation and litigation has ensued. As one writer has said,
"This volume of legislative and judicial concern indicates the existence
of intense and successful public pressure. It is also indicative of strict
enforcement of constitutional standards by a Court sensitive to assaults
on free speech guarantees."6
The "Libertarians," on the other hand, argue convincingly that any
form of censorship and the first amendment rights are simply incom-
patible. This group argues that exposure to obscenity does not result
in any harm to society which can be demonstrated, that it may even
be of social benefit,7 and there is no scientific evidence of adverse
effect upon sexual conduct.8 Secondly, they contend that censorship
suppression of the mass media in any manner merely for the benefit
of the juvenile will have the effect of ". . . reduc [ing] our treatment
of sex to the standards of a child's library..."9
It should be stated early in this discussion that as a matter of fact
the attack on obscenity is almost entirely one against various sex
portrayals. As Harry Kalvan, Jr. has said, writing in the Supreme
Court Review, the real question is, "What is the social utility of
excessively candid and explicit discussions of sex?"10 Although the
crusaders and the courts speak of other kinds of undesirable expres-
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
250,000 to 500,000 population, there was a 23 per cent increase in
forcible rape. Twenty-three of the thirty cities in this group reflected
increases. In actual numbers, there were 935 forcible rapes committed
in these cities for the first nine months of 1961, as against 761 for the
same period in 1960.
1962 Report 11.
4 Harry Kalvan, Jr., in The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960
Supreme Court Rev. 4, lists four possible dangers at which legislation in the
field is directed:
(1) The incitement to anti-social sexual conduct
2 Psychological excitement resulting from sexual imagery
3 The arousing of feelings of disgust and revulsion
(4) The advocacy of improper social values.
See also, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502 (1957), wherein Mr. Justice
Harlan indicates a possible fifth danger as being the possible impact of obscenity
on character and hence slowly and remotely on conduct. See text and discussion
infra accompan yng notes 64-72.
5 See Healilne, The Courier Journal, Louisville, Ky., February 21, 1963, p. 8,
concerning the report of Bantam Bookstore v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631 (1963).
64 Wash. U.L.Q. 475 (1962).
7 That the reading of obscene matter is a sort of purgative or escape valve,
see e.g., Karpman, The Sexual Offender and His Offenses: Etiology, Pathology,
Psychodynamics, and Treatment (1954).
8 St. John Stevas, Obscenity and the Law 196 (1956).
D United States v. Kennerley, 209 Fed. 119, 121 (S.D. N.Y. 1913).
10 Kalvan, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Supreme Court
Rev. 2, 12,
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sion such as violence, excretions and the like which might be sup-
pressed, it is obvious that the broad spectrnm of the assault is one
directed at suppressing sordid sex materials. 1 The tendency seems
to be to equate community standards in the obscenity field with
community sexual practices.'
2
Lastly, it should be pointed out that publishers of sex tainted,
obscene and pornographic matter have a vested interest of a much
more real nature than mere constitutionality-cash. The report of a
New York legislative commission,13 studying the obscenity problem in
1962, indicated that the business of pornography had become a five
hundred million dollar a year business.'
4
RHODE. IsrA's EXPEBINCE
As the fight rages between the citizen crusaders and the guardians
of fundamental constitutional liberties on the broader subject of speech
censorship in any form, the Supreme Court continues to render
decisions allegedly designed to clear up misgivings as to how
obscenity should be handled. Another opportunity was decisions
allegedly designed to clear up misgivings as to how obscenity
should be handled. Another opportunity was presented the Court,
early in the 1963 term, in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan.15
This action originated in the Rhode Island Superior Court by a
publisher to have a Rhode Island statute creating the "Rhode Island
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth" declared unconstitu-
tional, as in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments and to
enjoin the practices and acts of the commission. The superior court
granted the injunction but refused to hold the act unconstitutional.
The supreme court of Rhode Island dissolved the injunction and
affirmed the superior court on its determination that the act creating
the commission was not unconstitutional. The United States Supreme
Court reversed the high court of Rhode Island, condemning the prac-
tices of the commission but not declaring the commission an uncon-
stitutional creation.
The Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Brennan, who is the
author of most opinions in the field of obscenity,16 looked through the
forms and substance of the informal regulation and censorship carried
on by the commission and recognized that it "... may sufficiently
"1 See e.g., 1962 Report.
12 E.g., Kronhausen, Pornography and the Law 268-69 (1959).
13 1962 Report, op. cit. supra note 1.
14 ibid.
15 83 S. Ct. 631 (1963).
16 4 Wash. U.L.Q. 425, 484 (1962).
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inhibit the circulation of publications to warrant injunctive relief." r7
It is apparent that the court was attacking the successful informal
controls the commission had exerted over publication and distribution
of books, magazines and perhaps movies.'
8
Since the commission was an informal body although operating
within the state sanction, at least to the extent of being created by the
state,19 it is not unlike many other crusading organizations seeking
to protect the public in general and youth in particular from exposure
to obscenity.20 An examination of the condemned practices may reveal
some guidance as to the limits an approach like that of Rhode Island
can expect.
The commission's modus operandi was to send out notices to the
bookseller advising him that a publication was objectionable for sale
or display to youths under eighteen years of age as determined by a
majority vote of the commission. If this were a mere plea for
cooperation the court might not have so readily condemned the prac-
tice, but the notice went further and posed that the commission had
authority "to prevent the sale ... of indecent and obscene publications
to persons under eighteen years of age"2 ' and that "the attorney
general will act for this commission in case of non-compliance."
22
Justice Brennan recited from the evidence that a copy of the
objectionable list was furnished to the local police and that an officer
usually visited the distributor to see what action had been taken.
These practices caused the retailers and distributors to (a) refuse to
take new orders for the proscribed publications, (b) cease selling any
of the copies on hand, (c) withdraw from retailers all unsold copies,
and (d) return all unsold copies to the publishers. The resultant
economic effect upon the publishers23 of the condemned publications
was sufficient to give them standing to raise the issue. The Court held
that these practices amounted to a scheme of governmental censorship
17 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631, 638 (1963).
181d. at n. 1.
19 The commission was broadly given three missions by way of legislative
mandate: (1) to educate the public as to obscene publications as described by
the law of the state, (2) to recommend for prosecution violators of obscenity
peddling statutes, and (3) to recommend legislation in the field of obscenity
with emphasis upon the juvenile. Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631, n. 1
(1963).2 0 E.g., National Office of Decent Literature, Christian Brothers Boys As-
sociation, Citizens for Decent Literature, Churchmens Commission for Decent
Publications, and Americans for Moral Decency. See also Lockhart and McClure,
The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 302-316, for
a discussion of how these organizations effect censorship.
21Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631, 634, n. 5 (1963), sets out
the essential parts of the notice.
22 Ibid.
2 3 Appellants Dell Publications joined Bantam Books, Inc. in this action.
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devoid of the constitutionally required safeguards for state regulation
of obscenity.
24
Justice Brennan pointed out that in the now famous Roth-Alberts
decisions25 the Court had conceded that obscene communications are
outside the protections of the first and fourteenth amendments. The
states may regulate these communications if, and only if, they are
found to be obscene by application of the Court's current test of
"prurient appeal"20 expressed in the Roth decision. Even then, how-
ever, the ".... State is not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases
for dealing with obscenity . . . without regard to the possible con-
sequences for constitutionally protected speech."
27
It was clearly of great annoyance to the court in both the instant
case and in the earlier case of Marcus v. Search Warrant28 that some
of the publications seized were not in fact obscene as later determined
by the state courts.29 But it should be pointed out that there was much
more opportunity for a thoughtful consideration of the merit of the
publications before the Rhode Island commission than by use of the
procedures employed in Marcus where police acting pursuant to a
warrant seized some 11,000 pieces of material representing 280
separate issues in an all day raid. Later determination in the court
revealed that 180 of the issues were not obscene.30 Nonetheless, the
court felt that the Rhode Island commission, like the police procedure
in Marcus, failed to provide the procedural safeguards necessary for
the constitutionally protected expressions which are often separated
from the unprotected and obscene by ".... a dim and uncertain line."31
Mr. Justice Brennan also stated that although the commission may
have been limited to informal sanctions the result of its threats of
prosecution was to achieve suppression of the objectionable publica-
tions over and above the state's statutory criminal regulations of
obscenity. Brennan argued the state had obviated the need for those
regulations and as well as the safeguards of the criminal process. As
2 4 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631 (1963).
25 Roth v. United States, and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
decided together.
26Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest. Id. at 488.2 7 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 781 (1961).
28 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
29 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 835 S. Ct. 631, 635, n. 4 (1963). As of
January 1960 the commission had listed as objectionable some 106 publications
including Peyton Place by Grace Metalious, published in paper back edition by
appellant Dell, and the Bramble Bush by Charles Mergendakl, published by
Bantam in paper back edition; among the magazines were Playboy and Rogue.3 0 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 722-24 (1961).
31 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 835 S. Ct. 631, 637 (1963).
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to the state's argument that there had been no criminal prosecutions
in fact resulting from the procedures of the commission and that the
booksellers and distributors were free to ignore the commission's
letters and await prosecution for a violation under the existing
statutory obscenity laws, Mr. Justice Brennan replied that the threats
nonetheless produce from the average citizen the requisite compliance
whether the courts remain open or not.32 It is clear that few business-
men wish the unfavorable publicity involved in a costly court action
which may result in the label of "smut peddler" being attached to him.
The cumulative effect of these procedures, said Brennan, was an
unconstitutional "prior restraint," and prior restraints of any kind have
had a strong presumption against their validity in the Supreme Court
since the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota, decided in 1931. 3
Another important factor which clearly had a significant effect on
the Court's decision was that, while the commission's principle mission
was to protect the juvenile from obscenity, it invariably resulted in
depriving the adult reader of the opportunity to purchase the listed
publications, a result which was condemned by the court's decision
in Butler v. Michigan,3 4 as it reduced what the adult populace could
read. In remanding the case the Court did not reinstate the broad
injunctive relief sought by the appellant which would have enjoined
the commission from notifying retail or wholesale distributors in any
manner as to what books they had found to be objectionable. 35 It
would appear that such relief would be entirely too broad a restriction
upon the state. The Supreme Court noted however that injunctive
relief from threats of prosecution or license revocation had often been
granted by other courts.36 One writer has also submitted that this is
and has been an excellent device available to booksellers, publishers,
exhibitors and the like to prevent suppression (and profit loss) until
the matter is properly before the courts on the obscenity issues.37
Brennan, in closing for the majority, does say however that con-
sultation between law enforcement officers and distributors prior to an
action being brought under the obscenity statutes might be desirable
32 One writer suggests tbat the reason that there are few prosecutions under
state obscenity statutes is because of the fear of those seeking to suppress the
publication that by doing so the popularity of the publication may be increased.
22 U. Git. L. Rev. 216, 228 (1954).
33 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
34 352 U.S. 380 (1957).3 5 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631, 643 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
36 E.g., In re Louisiana News Co., 187 F. Supp. 241 (La. 1960)" New Amer-
ican Library of World Literature, Inc. v. Allen, 114 F. Supp. 823 (Ohio 1953);
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Melko, 25 N.J. Super. 292, 96 A.2d. 47 (1953).
37 68 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 502 (1955).
[Vol. 52,
NoTEs
where it is undertaken genuinely, to avoid prosecution, but he stressed
that this practice must be done by those in the law enforcement
business.
Mr. Justice Harlan, in the one dissent,38 did not believe that the
majority had reached the central issue of the problem presented, which
he saw as the accommodation that must be made between the state's
concern with the problem of juvenile delinquency and the right of
freedom of expression.3 9 In focusing his opinion upon the juvenile
problem he noted that this was a problem to be dealt with by the state
legislatures and pointed out that they should have a wide range of
action in this area and, unless clearly unconstitutional, their acts should
stand.
Justice Harlan, in disposing of the constitutional issues, felt that
the Court had allowed a "broadside" attack on the states' system of
obscenity regulation which the court refused to sanction in Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago40 in the area of motion pictures. In that case
an exhibitor attacked the city's film licensing regulation "broadside"
as an unconstitutional prior restraint, not to a particular movie film
but as to all. The Court held in Times Film that not necessarily all
prior restraints of expression were unconstitutional and remitted the
petitioner to his state court remedies as to a particular film for a
decision of whether its suppression would be unconstitutional applying
the Roth test.41 Harlan claimed that in view of the fact that the courts
were still available to the Rhode Island petitioner with all the requisite
judicial safeguards, he could stand his ground and await further gov-
ernmental action. This being true, whatever element of prior restraint
that existed in Rhode Island as a result of the commission's actions
was far less dangerous than that sanctioned in Times Film.
Further, said Justice Harlan, the practices here were even less
dangerous than the procedures employed in Kingsley Books, Inc. v.
Brown,2 where after a preliminary restraint the owner was entitled
to a full determination on the question of obscenity within two days
under the statute.43 Here, he argued, there was no legal sanction for a
restraint and the distribution of the questionable material was left
undisturbed.
Whatever might be said for Justice Harlan's distinctions on the
prior restraint issues, it is clear from his opinion that his greatest con-
38 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631, 642 (1963) (dissenting
opinion).
39 Ibid.
40365 U.S. 43 (1961).
41 Ibid.
42 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
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cern was with the states' need to have methods to combat juvenile
delinquency problems which could be caused in part by undesirable
publications. He felt that the court, without any guidance as to what
would be within the scope of constitutional commission action, had
cut into the effort of the state to deal with the juvenile delinquency
problem without the publisher or distributor ever having to vindicate
the protection given to their publication before any court.
Mr. Justice Clark, concurring in the result, condemned the specific
utterances of the commission in their "orders" to the distributors and
retailers but did join Harlan in an attempt to set out exactly what the
commission might do within the bounds of the constitution as he read
the majority opinion.44 The commission could constitutionally:
1. express its views on the character of any published reading or other
material,
2. endeavor to enlist the support of law enforcement authorities, or
the cooperation of publishers and distribuotrs, with respect to any
material the commission deems obscene, and
3. notify publishers, distributors and members of the public with
respect to its activities in these regards; but that it must take care to
refrain from the kind of overbearing utterances . .. that might tend
to give any person an erroneous impression either as to the extent
of the commissions authority or the consequences of a failure to heed
its warnings.45
The decision in the Rhode Island case makes it clear that any state
action directed at suppressing expression cannot simply take the form
of protection of the young and escape the constitutional safeguards
where it results, however indirectly, in the successful censorship of
expression that has not been judicially determined as obscene.
The decision, however, has no language to indicate how the court
might decide an action based on effective state legislation which safe-
guards minors against publications which, when judged against the
prurient interest test based on the standards of the community as a
whole, might not be found to be obscene.
If it is true, as many believe, that the court has now adopted the
"hard core" pornography rule as to what may be constitutionally
suppressed as to the public in general, 46 then it is obvious that the
young can be thus protected from the most base of obscene expression
by use of statutes employing the Roth test,4 7 and it is also apparently
44 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631, 641 (1963) (concurring
opinion).
45Ibid.
46 Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Supreme Court
Rev. 2, 42-43; Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Con-
stitutional Issue-What is Obscene?, 7 Utah L. Rev. 289, 295.
47Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
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true that where material is on its face so offensive as to affront current
community standards it is obscene without the use of the "prurient
appeal" test.45
However, the feeling is strong that the young reader should be
protected from those expressions which are something less than hard
core pornography but are none the less suggestive in the area of sex
and related offensive subject matter which may have adverse effects
upon the young. It is interesting to note that in England the protection
of the young has remained unswervingly the key effort in the area of
obscenity regulation.
ENGLAND'S APP OAcQ
As recently as 1959 the English obscenity statutes have been
revised and geared to protection of the juvenile.49 This most recent
English expression of concern for the morals of youth continues to
follow the test of obscenity laid down in the classic case of Regina v.
Hicklin50 in 1868, wherein the test as to whether a book was obscene
was whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influence, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.51
The Hicklin test came about as an interpretation of the Lord
Campbell Act, enacted by Parliament in 1857, which was apparently
the first act in Anglo-American legal history directed at the suppression
of writings whose sole purpose was to corrupt the morals of youth.52
The Hicklin test does more than merely protect the young reader; it
will protect any adult who is susceptible to immoral influence.
The prevailing English view in this area seems to be simply that
while there may be adults who would want to read obscene books, they
are simply not as apt to do so as the youn people, and the young
are those primarily sought to be protected.5 3 The present statutory
scheme in England employing the Hicklin test is modified only
slightly by such considerations as the intent of the author, dominant
theme, literary merit as a possible defense, and use of expert opinion
as to any such merit.54
The English statutes provide in general that a seller will be
guilty of a misdemeanor if he sells or distributes the objectionable
48 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 870 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
40 Obscene Publications Act, 7 and 8 Eliz. 2, 666 (1959); see also Children
and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act, 3 and 4 Eliz. 2, ch. 28 (1955).
503 Q.B. 360 (1868).
51 Id. at 371.
52 1 Washburn L.J. 220, 221 (1962).
53 Regina v. Reiter, 2 Q.B. 16 (1959).
54 1 Washburn L.J. 220, 222 (1962).
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material with the intent to corrupt those to whom it is so distributed,
or if he sells or distributes such matter recklessly as to whether or not
the matter would have a corrupting effect upon the person to whom
sold. The statutes also provide punishment for the sale of "horror
comics," which would tend to corrupt the youth.r
This short review of the obscenity regulation and the youth in
England, if nothing else, reveals either a greater concern over the
youth problem than that which appears in the United States or a
greater ability to deal with the problem than that which we now have.
If the growth of protection for the young is of chief concern to
the English courts, the courts of the United States seem to be going
the opposite direction. While the Hicklin Test was widely adopted
early in our history,5 6 the great fear has been that the "minds open"
criterion of the test would make the young and perverted the standard
measure of the mind of society and severely limit that which might
be available for distribution to the adult population. This fear was
first pronounced directly by the Supreme Court in Butler v. Mich-
igan,57 where the defendant bookseller was tried and found guilty
of a violation of a statute which made it a crime to make available
any obscene publication which tended to incite or corrupt minors,
after selling the book to a policeman. The conviction was reversed
by the Court as it found that the statute, thus interpreted, made a
crime of making available to the general public that which may be
unfit for the child. The determination of obscenity provided for under
the statute was made on the basis of examination of isolated passages,
a practice early condemned in the federal courts 8s The Court said
that the statute here was not reasonably restricted to the evil sought
to be protected against. However, it did say that the defendant could
have been convicted if it were shown that he in fact had made
obscene publications available to minors.59 Another example of the
same fear is demonstrated in the recent Rhode Island Commission
case discussed supra.
The rule announced in Butler6° effectively ended use of the Hicklin
558 and 4 Eliz. 2, ch. 28 (1955); see also Williams, Obscenity in Modern
English Law, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 680 (1955) for a discussion of the
English statutes.
56 E.g., United States v. Bennet, 24 Fed. Gas. 1093 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1879); United States v. Clarke, 38 Fed. 782 (1889); United States v. Smith,
45 Fed. 476 (1891); Burton v. United States, 142 Fed. 57 (1906).
5 862 U.S. 880 (1957).58 E.g., United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.
N.Y. 1933).




test, and shortly after Butler, the Roth-Alberts61 decisions firmed up
the rule that the measure for all is to be the effect of the writing on
the average adult. 2 The injection into the "prurient appeal" test that
material having "even the slightest redeeming social importance . . "
would receive protection63 makes it more obvious that the adult is left
to his own choice in the twilight area of obscenity, while the child is
remitted to the protection of his parents.
WHY SUpPmsS PUBLICATONS AT ALL?
In order to draw any useful conclusions as to how statutory
revision could be effected to offer increased ability for the states to
deal with the obscenity problem, an examination of some of the par-
ticular reasons for obscenity laws will be made.
Two researchers, in an exhaustive look at the problem of obscenity
in the mails, have suggested seven possible reasons why we suppress
obscenity:
1. Obscenity laws are necessary to prevent people from thinking bad
thoughts and thus adopting corrupt attitudes.
2 .... to prevent sexual misbehavior among adults.
3 ... to prevent sexual misbehavior by youthful and maladjusted per-
sons.
4 ... to protect parental interests.
5 ... to prevent unjustified infliction of emotional disturbance.
6 ... to prevent commercialized stimulation of psycho-sexual tensions.
7. Obscene publications may be banned because they form no useful
part in the exposition of ideas or the advancement of the arts.64
Of primary concern to any promulgation of statutes designed to
protect the young specifically are 3, 4 and 6 of this categorization;
however, it is readily apparent that the categories spill over into one
another and might be regarded as the sum total of why we do suppress
obscene publications.
Category 3. ".... to prevent sexual misbehavior by youthful sexually
maladjusted persons."65 This has been generally discussed as to the
absence of specific proof of such effects.66 Suffice it now to say that, to
the extent any law is formulated specifically to protect the youth as
61 Roth v. United States, and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)
(decided together).
02 Id. at 489.
63 Id. at 484.
64 Paul and Schwartz, Federal Censorship: Obscenity in the Mail 191-202
(1961).
65 Id. at 196.
66 See text accompanying notes, 1-14.
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an audience, a state must make it quite clear that such a law cannot
impose restraints on the freedom of the adult reading public.
Category 4. ".... to protect parental interests."67 While it is true
that parents have no "overriding legal right to bring up their children
as they choose... ,"68 it is also true that our history has placed high
regard upon parental teachings. This feeling on the part of parents
that, if a child must be exposed to erotic stimuli it would be the better
and perhaps only approach to have parental guidance in these presen-
tations so that they appear more nearly in their proper perspective.
The point is that the child will see only the "delights" of erotic behavior
without the consequences and aftermath that the adult knows will
follow any such experience. Thus a distorted picture of sexual experi-
ence is left with the child which might strengthen a ". . . socially
undesirable attitude toward sex and sexual relationships."69 The
purveyor of obscenity is then an unwanted intruder in the family in
the handling of the problem. The parent, of course, in this fluid and
mobile society cannot be left to handle this problem as he should
unless there is some method of preventing the sales to the child of the
objectionable material.
Category 6. ".. . to prevent commercialized stimulation of psycho-
sexual tensions."70 This category was first expressed by the American
Law Institute, which argues in its rationale that there is such a wall
of secrecy surrounding sexual behavior that it has built up a shame-
fullness of sexuality; yet most are attracted by natural desires to read
and see graphic materials on the subject.71 The mixed emotions of
desire on the one hand and revulsion on the other create "repression
tensions" which have an unsettling influence upon society. This ap-
proach argues that obscenity is not bad in the abstract, nor because
it demonstrably triggers misbehavior, but because of its unsettling
influence. If these tensions are present in the adult, a fortiori, it
would seem they are compounded in the developing and curious minds
of the young.
The institutes are of the opinion that while all the evidence is not
in as to what effect the "unsettling influence" may have upon in-
dividuals, until it is in commercial exploitations of these tensions
should be none the less a justification for anti-obscenity laws.
The remaining categorizations stated above have been much dis-
67 Paul and Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 64, at 197.
68 Ibid.
6946 Minn. L. Rev. 1009, 1039 (1962).
70 Paul and Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 64, at 199.71 Paul and Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 64, at 199 sets out a discussion of the
American Law Institute rationale.
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cussed and require no further explanation here. Others have also
argued that, regardless of whether there is a danger, the effects of
which can be demonstrated, parents and others who rebel at the
commercial efforts to exploit obscenity and to foster its wide circulation
and for numerous other reasons must be accommodated as a matter
of Real Politik.
72
Thus, we might condemn commercial distribution which exploits
obscenity and which is either intentionally aimed at youth (and perhaps
others with an obvious obsessive interest) or which is carried on with
reckless disregard of the quality of the audience whose patronage is
solicited."73
FomaNG A TEsT
The Supreme Court, in combatting the onslaught of obscenity litiga-
tion, has struggled to come up with a satisfactory word test to apply
in this area. In Roth, the Court discarded the "clear and present
danger" test developed in the other first amendment cases74 in order
to avoid the problem of dealing with the lack of demonstrable effects
and adopted the current test of "prurient appeal,"75 which has ap-
parently been coupled with a test of "patent offensiveness." That is,
if a writing is on its face ". . . so offensive as to affront community
standards of decency,"' it may be considered obscene and outside the
protections of the first amendment.
76
As to the inherent problems with these word tests, such a dis-
cussion is outside the scope of this note, but for our purposes here we
need only say that these tests are based on the mind of the average
adult and not the juvenile. Therefore, taking the existing tests, it
could be argued that the Court would accept a test of "prurient
appeal" based on an average child of a certain age group.
The difficulties in determining whether a publication is dominantly
one of prurient appeal to an average minor of a given age group may
be insurmountable. Even with expert psychological testimony, we are
told that it is impossible to determine what has prurient appeal for the
adult; hence, it could be argued that such a test is inconceivable
with regard to a given age group.
It might also be argued that if that test is too difficult perhaps
the approach could be on the basis of whether the material simply
72 Op. cit. supra note 69, at 1040.
73 Ibid.74 The test was developed in Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)
and modified in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
75 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).7 0 Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482 (1962).
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is a gross violation of community sensibilities as regards its distribution
to the protected group without use of the test of "prurient appeal."T'
But if it is true, as many believe, that it is for the jury to make the
determination as to allegedly obscene publications for the reason that
they represent the contemporary community standards, 78 it would seem
that they should be allowed to make the determination with regard
to what is prurient appeal or is patently offensive to a certain age
group in the community. The fact that jurors are parents and have
been children should qualify them as well as anyone to make this
determination, and in so doing they should be allowed to have all the
evidence that can be mustered, including not only psychological evi-
dence as to possible effects, but also evidence as to literary or scientific
merit, intent of the author, intent of the seller and publisher, the
circumstances of sale, the method by which it is advertised and
promoted, and the probable audience of the material. Thus armed,
the jury should be able to determine whether a given publication
should be suppressed as to the age group concerned but not perhaps
as to one outside of the class.
This approach is what has been called "variable obscenity;"79 that
is, that different standards can be applied to material considering its
audience. It is not really a new concept; many jurisdictions have
recognized for some time that in the hands of certain people, under
some circumstances, even that which would be "hard core" pornog-
raphy as to the general public might not be obscene as to researchers
in the field.8 0
SC] ENT=
Assuming as we have that the goal of anti-obscenity legislation is
not altogether directed at a given writing but at the purveyors of
obscenity, any legislation must strike at the sale of the objectionable
material, for in the commercialization of the material the only ends
of the seller, distributor and publishers are profits.
Any effort at placing strict criminal liability upon purveyors of
obscenity has been eliminated by the Court's decision in Smith v.
California.8s The Court now requires that a bookseller must know-
77 Ibid.
8 See e.g., Hand's opinion in United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2
Cir. 1936); Kalvan, The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Supreme
Court Rev. 2, at 39.7 9 Lockhart and McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Con-
stitutional Standards, 45 Minn. L. Rev. 5, 83-88 (1960).
80 As to the growing importance of the receiving group, see ge'..ally 34 Ind.
L. Rev. 426; Lockhart and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the
Constitution, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 295, 342 (1953).
81361 U.S. 147 (1959).
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ingly sell such materials. When this standard is applied to any
obscenity statute it makes punishment of a seller almost, if not wholly,
impossible in the border line obscenity situations with regard to the
existing prurient interest test on the average adult. If the bookseller
has read the book and thought it not obscene, or if the distributor for
an entire state as in Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan82 is sought to be
prosecuted, it is reasonably obvious he will have found it impossible
to have any specific knowledge of the obscene contents of any book.
Prosecution under any statute designed to punish the purveyor in these
circumstances seem, doomed to failure.
This difficult situation seems compounded when the requirement
of scienter is coupled with the suggested pruriency or patent offensive-
ness test for a given age group, but it should be noted that the require-
ment of scienter laid down by the Court in Smith v. California is not
clear as to just how much knowledge is required, although from the
decision it could be argued that the reckless sale without any concern
on the part of the merchant as to character or content might be
sufficient to fulfill the requirement.
83
It is submitted, however, that since dissemination for profit aimed
at the juvenile is what has raised the loudest protests, we could find
sufficient scienter on the part of a distributor or seller if he clearly
should know that a substantial part of his audience for given publica-
tions is the juvenile group and it appears that his motive behind
selling is either to intentionally exploit that protected group's interests
in the obscene or that he recklessly emphasizes by advertising the
pruriency of the matter. Then it could hardly be argued that he has
no knowledge as to the prurient appeal of the publication.
Here it seems that we are attacking the large distributors and pub-
lishers because of their commercial exploitation, and by taking into
account their conduct and motives in the creations and sale of objec-
tionable material, the necessary scienter is obvious when as a matter
of fact the problem is a more local one. Indeed, some have argued it
would be almost impossible to find exploitation and improper motives
in the ".... sedentary street corner magazine vendor."84 While more
difficult, a de facto look at the local bookseller can at a glance inform
the observer whether his sales emphasis is upon the questionable
material, and it is not believed that the seller is unaware of the general
nature of publications and the reputation of a given publisher. The
defense of "tie in sales" which has been pleaded in obscenity prosecu-
8283 S.Ct. 631 (1963).
83 Paul and Schwartz, op. cit. supra note 64, at 218.
84 Id. at 216.
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tions, would lead one to believe that the average seller of the obscene
or borderline obscene knows only too well what he is selling. It should
be noted that "tie in" book sales have been eliminated in most
jurisdictions and it is believed that such sales may now be uncon-
stitutional as a result of a recent Supreme Court decision.85
Another method by which the requisite scienter may be determined
would be where a citizens' group, acting within the confines of the
Rhode Island Commission decision, informs the local seller that given
material seems objectionable as to the protected age groups, he could
be charged with the duty of inspecting those materials with regard to
sales to minors.
It has also been argued that well-publicized obscenity proceedings
and prosecutions against publications of the same nature as those in
question might be sufficient notice to those in the business as to war-
rant a finding of scienter.86
The best approach to the determination of requisite scienter, how-
ever, seems to be a "totality of fact" approach considering all the
possibilities heretofore indicated. Such a fact approach should include
consideration by the jury of the reputation of publishers, cover pic-
tures, manner of display, method of acquiring the material, and
repetitions of offenses on the part of the seller.8 7 It must be remem-
bered that what is sought to be prevented is not the isolated sale to a
minor but the general commercialization. This practice being stopped,
the greatest dangers are eliminated.
SuGGEsTED STATE STATUORY REFORMS
It is an extremely difficult task to formulate any practical and
usable statutory proposals in the field of obscenity, not only because
of the conflicting value objectives but also because of the rapid change
of acceptable constitutional standards in the field. As has been stated,
however, it is believed that such changes are needed to provide the
states with more effective methods in dealing with the juvenile
problem.
The possible changes recommended here are based solely on
protection of the minor from the obscene publications. Despite the
argument that specific protection for the minor will not be effective
if these are not extended to the adult population,"" and despite the
extremely hard job of policing, it would seem that such changes would
85 Lowes, Inc. v. United States, 83 S. Ct. 97 (1962).88 Lockhart and McClure, op. cit. supra note 79, at 107.
87 1962 Report 111-115.
88 68 Harv. L. Rev. 494, 500 (1955).
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be considerably more useful tools to achieve the desired ends than the
existing statutory schemes in many states.89
1. It is believed that specific statutory provisions should be en-
acted which comprehend a test of obscenity based on the variable
obscenity concept with the criteria for judging whether or not material
is obscene to be based on its patent offensiveness, or prurient appeal,
considered as a whole, to the average or ordinary child of the age
group sought to be protected.
2. Penal laws for the sale of obscene literature to minors should
provide for the requirement of scienter as a necessary concomitant
of the offense. The statute should include three levels or degrees of
the offense with the intentional sale of obscnity to the protected class
being the most serious. A lesser penalty should be provided for the
sale of the objectionable material to one of the protected class which
is made in reckless disregard as to its contents and character, and an
even lesser offense should be provided for a bookseller who negligently
sells the objectionable material without reasonably having inspected
it as to its contents.
Such a statute is designed to fall most heavily upon the purveyor
who intentionally takes advantage of the protected group and its
inability to see what is represented in its true light. It is true that this
approach imputes a duty upon the bookseller to investigate the con-
tents before sales to the minor. In Smith v. California,"° however, the
Court expressly states that they were not passing on ". . whether
there might be circumstances under which the state constitutionally
might require that a bookseller investigate further, or might put on
him the burden of explaining why he did not and what the circum-
stances might be."91
8. Legislative action should be taken to specify a method of rapid
determination of whether or not a given publication is obscene with
regard to the suggested test. The method of determinations should be
special with regard to the juvenile obscenity regulations and be
included -within them. Such a statute should include:
(a) Provisions for ex parte application for temporary injunctions
upon showing of probable cause to restrain the sale of the allegedly
objectionable material to the protected group.
(b) Provision for a declaratory judgment proceeding brought
against the objectionable book, magazine, etc., by its name to de-
termine whether or not it is obscene with regard to the protected group,
89 Ky. Rev. Stat. 486.100, 436.110 (1962).
903 61 U.S. 147 (1959).
91 Id. at 54.
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initiated by the local prosecutor. Where a temporary injunction order
to restrain the sale has been issued, the declaratory judgment proceed-
ing should follow within a very short time, probably no longer than
one week. Such a proceeding should include a provision for jury trial
if requested by the seller or other party in interest.
(c) Provision that the findings of the declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding shall constitute adequate proof of the requisite scienter on
the part of all sellers within the jurisdiction of the court.
The injunction is of course not new to the field of obscenity regula-
tion92 and does not require any arbitrary search and seizure such as
that condemned in Marcus v. Search Warrant.3 While this is a prior
restraint, it is only a partial one with respect to the protected group
and does not prevent the sale to the general public. It should be
noted, however, that in view of the Supreme Court's decision in the
Time Film case and Kingsley Books Inc. v. Brown,95 such a pro-
cedure might be acceptable with regard to the general obscenity
statutes.
Use of the declaratory judgment proceeding prevents undue bad
publicity for the seller and fulfills the Supreme Court's mandate of
judicial determination. Such a procedure must provide for a final
determination of obscenity within a short time, it would seem, even
with regard to the restricted class. The procedure is in use in several
states98 in general obscenity statutes and has evoked favorable com-
ment by writers in the field.
97
It should be noted that where such a procedure is employed within
the general obscenity statutes, a special provision could be adopted
to allow a finding of acceptability with regard to the adult public but
could allow its suppression with regard to the protected class.
4. There should be state legislative determination of the age group
or groups which are to be protected, but the maximum age at which
the juvenile should be protected should be sixteen years, after which
he should be considered an adult for the purpose of these statutes.
Sixteen years is an arbitrary age to lift reading restrictions, but it
is believed that in the modem social climate the young people have
92 E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 847.011(7) (Supp. 1961); Ga. Code Ann. §
26-6306(u) (Supp. 1961); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-1510 (Supp. 1961).
93867 U.S. 717 (1961).
94 Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 48 (1961).
95 854 U.S. 436 (1957).
96 Teleading state in the use of this type of declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding has been Massachusetts. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272 § 28(c) & (d)
(Supp. 1959); see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 847.011(7) (Supp. 1961); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 269.565 (Supp. 1962).97 Lockhart and McClure, Obscenity in the Courts, 20 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 587, 607 (1955).
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by this time been sufficiently exposed to the "facts of life" to be able
to cope with material which is suitable for adult reading, and it is
believed that any more than normal susceptibilities to sex perversion
and the like will have been discovered.
One possible caveat to the age limit could be that for the excep-
tional child of above average intellect a licensing system, perhaps
administered by the schools to allow the child adult reading privileges,
could be devised. Such a licensing could require psychiatric examina-
tion for stability of personality of the selected child.
5. Of a more general nature, legislative provisions could be en-
acted to provide for a commission to serve within the restrictions laid
down in the Rhode Island Commission case9 to inform the public,
law enforcement officers and those in the business of bookselling of
that which they deem to be objectionable. Such a commission should
also strive to seek the cooperation of the publishing industry, an
approach which seems to have proven some success in the field of
comic books.9 9 Given a slightly broader mandate, such a commission
could and should, in conjunction with the education department of the
state, of which it might be a part, devise and install in the school
systems a program of sex education, to begin very early in the child's
education, which would progress from year to year and perhaps greatly
reduce the need for special obscenity regulation.
CONCL.USION
While there is an absence of scientific authority to demonstrate
adverse effects resulting from juvenile consumption of obscene and
near-obscene, sex-oriented publications, the growing concern of par-
ents, educators and law enforcement officials that there is a very real
danger to our young as well as to society as a whole, should be
accommodated by the enactment of special state anti-obscenity
statutes designed to protect only that class. It is believed that such
legislation would be found to be a valid exercise of the police powers
of the states.
H. Hamilton Rice
98 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 83 S. Ct. 631 (1963).
99 1962 Report 154.
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